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There is a lesson to be learned: Attorneys pursuing a habeas
corpus petition must be aware of all subsequent federal law that
could possibly apply in the case. Rights to argue those issues
should be claimed if there is any reasonable possibility that the
client is covered by the subsequently announced law.
Attorney's should carefully review the jury instructions they
use at trial and to review the ones the Commonwealth offers.
In Virginia there is a jury instruction very similar to the one in
Yates:
Instruction No. 34.240
Inference of Malice - Use of Deadly Weapon
You may infer malice from the deliberate use of a deadly
weapon unless, from all the evidence, you have a reasonable
doubt as to whether malice existed.
A "deadly weapon" is any object or instrument that is like-
ly to cause death or great bodily injury because of the manner,
and under the circumstances, in which it is used.
This instruction would probably pass a constitutional test
since the language allows the jury to consider all the evidence
presented and then draw their own conclusions. The instruction
does not require that the jury come to one conclusion unless
defendant disproves malice.
There is another instruction used in Virginia that does come




You may infer that every person intends the natural and
probable consequence of his acts.
The language of the instruction says the jury "may infer"
though it does not instruct the jury to consider any of the
evidence in making this inference. The U.S. Supreme Court is
clear that the burden is on the State to prove all the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A strong argument could
be made that this instruction is unconstitutional as written, at
least without the exploratory phrase "but need not" following
the word "may." (Elizabeth P. Murtagh)
LOWENFIELD v. PHELPS
108 S.Ct. 546 (1988)
FACTS
A Louisiana trial court found Lowenfield guilty of two
counts of manslaughter and three counts of first degree murder.
An essential element in the definition of the first degree murder
offense was identical to the sentencing phase aggravating factor
of intention "to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon more
than one person." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(A)(3) (West
1986). Before the jury began sentencing deliberations the trial
judge gave the jury instructions. After the jury failed to reach a
unanimous verdict, the judge twice polled the jury to assess the
benefit of continued deliberation. The judge subsequently re-
instructed the jury, the jury returned for further deliberation,
and thereafter returned a death verdict. Defense counsel did not
object to either the polling or supplemental charge. The Loui-
siana Supreme Court upheld Lowenfield's convinction. 495
So.2d 1245. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana denied relief, and the United States Court
of Appeals Fifth Circuit affirmed. 817 F.2d 285
(CA5 1987).
HOLDING
a) Supplemental charge by judge did not constitute coercion.
Lowenfield claimed that the jury was improperly coerced by
the judge's supplemental charge. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108
S.Ct. 546, 550. The Supreme Court majority, however, found
that because the object of the jury system is to reach unanimity
by weighing contrasting views, "the use of a supplemental
charge has long been sanctioned." Id. The petitioner also urged
that because unanimity was not required to reach a proper
sentence, in that the Louisiana legislature provides that if a jury
could not agree the court shall impose a life sentence, La. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 905.8 (West 1984), the second charge
was impermissable under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution. Lowenfield, 108 S.Ct.
at 551. The Court concluded that the state had a strong interest
in having the jury express the will of the community as to peti-
tioner's sentence, and not to use the legislature default
mechanism. Id.
b) The polling of the jury did not exacerbate the coercion.
Lowenfield claimed that the polling of the jury exacerbated
the coercive effect of the supplemental charge. Id. at 552. The
Court's view was that since the judge's inquiry into the
numerical division of the jury questioned how the jurors felt
about further deliberation, and did not go to the merits of the
case, the polling did not effect the constitutionality of the
sentence. Although the jury handed down the final verdict soon
after the supplemental instruction, defense counsel did not ob-
ject to either the polling or supplemental instruction at the time.
Although petitioner waived no rights by this inaction, the omis-
sion was said to indicate that the petitioner did not perceive, as
readily apparent, the potential for coercion. Id.
c) Duplication of element of the offense and aggravating factor
not constitutionally impermissable.
Petitioner claimed that the sentencing phase did not narrow
the class of death eligible murderers. Id. at 553. Lowenfield ob-
jected to the fact that the sole aggravating factor found by the
jury during sentencing was identical to an element of the
underlying crime. The Court ruled that "petitioner's argument
that the parallel nature of these provisions requires that his
sentence be set aside rest on a mistaken premise as to the
necessary role of aggravating circumstances is not an end in
itself, but only a means of sufficiently guiding the jury's discre-
tion and narrowing the class of death-eligible convicts. This
guiding and narrowing can be done in both the guilt stage or
the sentencing stage. Id.
The Court concluded that state statutes fulfill the constitu-
tional requirements in one of two ways. A legislature may nar-
row the definition of capital offenses, so that the jury responds
to the constitutional concerns by finding guilt; or the legislature
may have a broad definition of capital crimes which require
narrowing through the use of aggravating circumstances at the
sentencing phase. Id. at 555. The court held that the Louisiana
statute sufficiently narrowed the definition of capital murder to
meet the constitutional requirements. Thus, the finding of an
independent aggravating factor was not necessary. The Loui-
siana statute both narrows the class of defendants, and allows
for proper consideration of mitigating factors to produce a cor-
rectly based decision. Id.
d) Separate Opiniofn
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joins, and
Justice Stevens joins as to Part I, dissenting. Part I: The jury
charge and supplemental polling gave the impression that the
judge was anxious for a quick verdict, collectively creating an
unacceptable risk of coercion. Id. at 555-556. Part II: The
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punish-
ment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id. at 555. The fact that the statutory aggravating
factor duplicated an element of the underlying crime prevented
the adequate guidance of the jury's discretion as to the proprie-
ty of the death sentence, in that it led the jury to decide the
point in the guilt phase instead of the penalty phase. Id. at 556.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
Although at first glance the United States Supreme Court
ruling in Lowenfield appears contrary to the spirit of Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and Greg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976), the Lowenfield decision is technically correct. The
Court previously held that the constitution requires an in-
dividualized determination as to the culpability of the defen-
dant, and the appropriateness of the death penalty. This has
traditionally been implemented through the balancing of ag-
gravating and mitigating factors. The Supreme Court now ex-
plains that a death sentence can be based on a statutory defini-
tion of capital crimes which sufficiently narrow the scope of
death-eligible murderers. The jury is still required to consider
any factors in mitigation in order to reach a constitutionally
sufficient individualized decision.
The Lowenfield case is not directly applicable in Virginia,
which has a narrowed definition of capital murder, Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C)(1988). Also, the unconstitutionality of the
Louisiana factor, on its face or as applied, was not an issue in
Lowenfield. At least one of Virginia's aggravating factors is
constitutionally suspect. (See summary of Maynard v. Cart-
wright, infra). Whether these differences are constitutionally
significant must await further answers from the Court. (Sandra
Fischer)
MILLS v. MARYLAND
486 U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1860 (1988)
FACTS
Ralph Mills was convicted of the first-degree murder of his
celmate in the Maryland Correctional Institute in Hagerstown,
Maryland, and sentenced to death. The jury was provided with
a verdict form which required, in part, that it be marked "yes"
as to every mitigating circumstance listed that had been found
by a preponderance of the evidence to exist, and "no" as to
factors not so found. The jury was then to weigh the mitigating
circumstances found against aggravating circumstances. The
jury marked "no" in every case, and where the form asked for
any other mitigating circumstances found to exist, marked
"none," thereby sentencing Mills to death.
Mills appealed, claiming that the State's death penalty, as
applied to him, was unconstitutionally mandatory because it re-
quired the imposition of the death sentence if the jury
unanimously found an aggravating circumstance, but could not
agree unanimously as to the existence of any particular
mitigating circumstance. The defendant hypothesized that "even
if some or all of the jurors were to believe some mitigating cir-
cumstance or circumstances were present, unless they could
unanimously agree on the existence of the same mitigating fac-
tor, the sentence necessarily would be death.
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, Mills
v. State, 310 Md. 33, 527 A.2d 3 (1987), interpreting the statute
as requiring unanimity to accept or reject any mitigating factor,
noting that in the absence of unanimity on the ultimate ques-
tion of what sentence should be imposed, the statute (Md. Ann.
Code, Art. 27, §413 (1987 Repl. Vol.)) required life imprison-
ment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Mills v. Maryland,
108 S.Ct. 1860 (1987).
HOLDING
a) Constitutionality of a statute that requires a jury to
unanimously agree on the existence of any mitigating cir-
cumstance in order to introduce that evidence in the
weighing process.
